## Tags - Part of: [[Neuroscience]] [[Cognitive science]] - Related: - Includes: - Additional: ## Main resources - <iframe src="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness" allow="fullscreen" allowfullscreen="" style="height:100%;width:100%; aspect-ratio: 16 / 5; "></iframe> ## Landscapes - [A landscape of consciousness: Toward a taxonomy of explanations and implications](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0079610723001128?via%3Dihub) [[Images/ec48207422510bed4c7df940f6806506_MD5.jpeg|Open: Pasted image 20240919000936.png]] ![[Images/ec48207422510bed4c7df940f6806506_MD5.jpeg]] [All 325+ Competing Consciousness Theories In One Video. - YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h5G6Oc_V3Lw) - [Theories of consciousness | Nature Reviews Neuroscience](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41583-022-00587-4) - [Models of consciousness - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Models_of_consciousness) - [Models of consciousness - Scholarpedia](http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Models_of_consciousness) - [Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/) - Joscha Bach: Consciousness as a self organizing, coherence optimizing learning algorithm [x.com/Plinz/status/1810902687585903033](https://x.com/Plinz/status/1810902687585903033) - [Frontiers | Integrated world modeling theory expanded: Implications for the future of consciousness](https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/computational-neuroscience/articles/10.3389/fncom.2022.642397/full) [Frontiers | An Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) of Consciousness: Combining Integrated Information and Global Neuronal Workspace Theories With the Free Energy Principle and Active Inference Framework; Toward Solving the Hard Problem and Characterizing Agentic Causation](https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/artificial-intelligence/articles/10.3389/frai.2020.00030/full) - [Frontiers | A Relativistic Theory of Consciousness](https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.704270/full) - [Electromagnetic Field Topology as a Solution to the Boundary Problem of Consciousness - YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tX8b3ng37Nw&t=3411s&pp=ygUyYW5kcmVzIGdvbWV6IGVtbWlsc29uIHRvcG9sb2dpY2FsIGJvdW5kYXJ5IHByb2JsZW0%3D) - [[Omnidisciplinarity|Omnidisciplionary]] ## Brainstorming Is mind upload possible? Depends: - when you assume physicalist position in philosophy of mind, then your experience corresponds to the the physical system corresponding roughly to your brain (or nervous system and/or other subsystems of your biological system) - there are people without parts of the brain that still say they're conscious, therefore you can technically remove, add, replace parts, or there are conjoined twins that share experiences through merged brains - you maybe don't need to be the whole complex system, you may be just the electromagnetic activity, or just the electrochemical activity, or some computational algorithm that the brain uses, some generative model, or some other mathematical pattern, etc., so you need to transfer that pattern that encodes the conscious experience through time from biological substrate to other (digital or analog) substrate " Do you think consciousness has any special computational properties? Depends on the definition and model of consciousness, but I like QRI's holistic field computation ideas [Digital Computers Will Remain Unconscious Until They Recruit Physical Fields for Holistic Computing Using Well-Defined Topological Boundaries \| Qualia Computing](https://qualiacomputing.com/2022/06/19/digital-computers-will-remain-unconscious-until-they-recruit-physical-fields-for-holistic-computing-using-well-defined-topological-boundaries/) IIT argues with integrated information [Integrated information theory - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theory) maybe you truly need consciousness for information binding problem [[2012.05208] On the Binding Problem in Artificial Neural Networks](https://arxiv.org/abs/2012.05208) Global workspace theory argues with some form of global integration of information into some workspace [Global workspace theory - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_workspace_theory) Selfawareness isnt good in LLMs as emergent circuits are different than what the LLMs actually say (from last Anthropic paper on the biology of LLMs), so some recursive connections might be needed (strange loop model of conscousness?) Joscha Bach argues with conscousness being coherence inducing operator, maybe thats needed for reliability [Joscha Bach - Consciousness as a coherence-inducing operator - YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qoHCQ1ozswA&pp=ygVHSm9zY2hhIEJhY2ggYXJndWVzIHdpdGggY29uc2NvdXNuZXNzIGJlaW5nIGNvaGVyZW5jZSBpbmR1Y2luZyBvcGVyYXRvcizSBwkJkQoBhyohjO8%3D) Neurosymbolic people need added symbolic components for strong generalization, like in DreamCoder program synthesis, and Chollet argues that's part of definition of consciousness Evolutionaries need evolution like evolutionary algorithms, maybe you could argue you can get consciousness only this way Physicists/computational neuroscientists need differential equations, like liquid neural networks, and some might argue consciousness only arises from this Some people need divergent novelty search without objective, like Kenneth Stanley, and you could also connect this with conscousness " - I wonder often how close to the brain do we actually have to get to create machines that can be merged with our biological neural network or to create machines that can be considered as conscious. Do we need to match "hardware architecture" architecture deeply, or just "software architecture" lightly. ([Theories of consciousness | Nature Reviews Neuroscience](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41583-022-00587-4) , [Consciousness - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness#Models) , https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Models_of_consciousness) Qualia research institute ([On Connectome and Geometric Eigenmodes of Brain Activity: The Eigenbasis of the Mind?](https://qri.org/blog/eigenbasis-of-the-mind) , https://philarchive.org/rec/GMEDFT) and some neuromophic computing groups ([Joscha Bach, Yulia Sandamirskaya: "The Third Age of AI: Understanding Machines that Understand" - YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6xHVtgwNBcY)) are on this spectrum very close to the "we need to replicate hardware deeply". IIT, GWT ([What a Contest of Consciousness Theories Really Proved | Quanta Magazine](https://www.quantamagazine.org/what-a-contest-of-consciousness-theories-really-proved-20230824/) , https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9916582/ ), Active Inference (https://direct.mit.edu/books/oa-monograph/5299/Active-InferenceThe-Free-Energy-Principle-in-Mind) and Joscha Bach ([Joscha Bach - Consciousness as a coherence-inducing operator - YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qoHCQ1ozswA)) is more on the functional level. (https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frai.2020.00030/full), free energy principle tries to merge these levels? ([Karl Friston on Unifying The Cognitive Sciences - YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q9hOPiSHbwo) https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S037015732300203X [Inner screen model of consciousness: applying free energy principle to study of conscious experience - YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yZWjjDT5rGU) [Physics as Information Processing ~ Chris Fields ~ AII 2023](https://coda.io/@active-inference-institute/fields-physics-2023) [#67 Prof. KARL FRISTON 2.0 [Unplugged] - YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xKQ-F2-o8uM) ) But I'm open to anything on this spectrum really. - I'm giving high probability that carrier of consciousness is some algorithm in neuroscience from {global neuronal workspace theory, integrated information theory, recurrent processing theory, predictive processing theory, neurorepresentationalism, dendritic integration theory} or their combination (An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness https://www.cell.com/neuron/fulltext/S0896-6273(24)00088-6 ) or low-level electromagnetic field [Electromagnetic theories of consciousness - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_theories_of_consciousness) alternatively from {Attention schema theory, Dynamic core hypothesis, Damasio's theory of consciousness, Higher-order theories of consciousness, Holonomic brain theory, Multiple drafts model, Orchestrated objective reduction} (all have a wiki page) [Models of consciousness - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Models_of_consciousness) [Models of consciousness - Scholarpedia](http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Models_of_consciousness) but now just... which model is empirically correct, or which combination, or if it's a completely different structure we haven't found yet there have been some attempts at empirical measurements [What a Contest of Consciousness Theories Really Proved | Quanta Magazine](https://www.quantamagazine.org/what-a-contest-of-consciousness-theories-really-proved-20230824/) but so far not much results if at all reductive physicalism and closed individualism are true 😄 [A new theory of Open Individualism - Opentheory.net](https://opentheory.net/2018/09/a-new-theory-of-open-individualism/) I'm betting it does with a high probability - I feel like nobody actually knows anything about consciousness (as in existence of subjective experience) and everyone is just guessing and following intuition (i havent seen satisfying enough idea how to actually empirically test sentience of a system) There are so many diverse different definitions and models of consciousness Plus there are many different possible ontologies Consciousness science feels like the most divided field out there (IIT vs GWT vs biology vs physics models vs selfreference,...) Different definitions: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/KpD2fJa6zo8o2MBxg/consciousness-as-a-conflationary-alliance-term Different models: [Models of consciousness - Scholarpedia](http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Models_of_consciousness) https://www.researchgate.net/publication/360364308_Theories_of_consciousness [Models of consciousness - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Models_of_consciousness?wprov=sfla1) Meta hard problem of consciousness: [The Meta-Problem of Consciousness with David Chalmers - YouTube](https://youtu.be/yHTiQrrUhUA?si=3sohcjdXYVX4EiH1) Different ontologies: [Bayesian Brain and the Ultimate Nature of Reality - YouTube](https://youtu.be/kw5Q5h8s6FI?si=82iVFEKfmOe6nd_J) - Does consciousness equation fundamentally reside on substrate independent emergent layer like software or on fundamental ontological layer like fields of physics or both are different lenses on the same conscious system on different levels? - [[Ontology]] ## Deep dives - “Figure 2. Depiction of the human brain in terms of phenomenological correspondences, as well as computational (or functional), algorithmic, and implementational levels of analysis (Reprinted from Safron, 2021b). Depiction of the human brain in terms of entailed aspects of experience (i.e., phenomenology), as well as computational (or functional), algorithmic, and implementational levels of analysis (Marr, 1983; Safron, 2020b). A phenomenological level is specified to provide mappings between consciousness and these complementary/supervenient levels of analysis. Modal depictions connotate the radically embodied nature of mind, but not all images are meant to indicate conscious experiences. Phenomenal consciousness may solely be generated by hierarchies centered on posterior medial cortex, supramarginal gyrus, and angular gyrus as respective visuospatial (cf. consciousness as projective geometric modeling) (Rudrauf et al., 2017; Williford et al., 2018), somatic (cf. grounded cognition and intermediate level theory) (Varela et al., 1992; Barsalou, 2010; Prinz, 2017), and intentional/attentional phenomenology (cf. Attention Schema Theory) (Graziano, 2019). Computationally, various brain functions are identified according to particular modal aspects, either with respect to generating perception (both unconscious and conscious) or action (both unconscious and potentially conscious, via posterior generative models). (Note: Action selection can also occur via affordance competition in posterior cortices (Cisek, 2007), and frontal generative models could be interpreted as a kind of forward-looking (unconscious) perception, made conscious as imaginings via parameterizing the inversion of posterior generative models). On the algorithmic level, these functions are mapped onto variants of machine learning architectures—e.g., autoencoders and generative adversarial networks, graph neural networks (GNNs), recurrent reservoirs and liquid state machines—organized according to potential realization by neural systems. GNN-structured latent spaces are suggested as a potentially important architectural principle (Zhou et al., 2019), largely due to efficiency for emulating physical processes (Battaglia et al., 2018; Bapst et al., 2020; Cranmer et al., 2020). Hexagonally organized grid graph GNNs are depicted in posterior medial cortices as contributing to quasi-Cartesian spatial modeling (and potentially experience) (Haun and Tononi, 2019; Haun, 2020), as well as in dorsomedial, and ventromedial PFCs for agentic control. With respect to AI systems, such representations could be used to implement not just modeling of external spaces, but of consciousness as internal space (or blackboard), which could potentially be leveraged for reasoning processes with correspondences to category theory, analogy making via structured representations, and possibly causal inference. Neuroimaging evidence suggests these grids may be dynamically coupled in various ways (Faul et al., 2020), contributing to higher-order cognition as a kind of navigation/search process through generalized space (Hills et al., 2010; Kaplan and Friston, 2018; Çatal et al., 2021). A further GNN is speculatively adduced to reside in supramarginal gyrus as a mesh grid placed on top of a transformed representation of the primary sensorimotor homunculus (cf. body image/schema for the sake of efficient motor control/inference). This quasi-homuncular GNN may have some scaled correspondence to embodiment as felt from within, potentially morphed/re-represented to better correspond with externally viewed embodiments (potentially both resulting from and enabling “mirroring” with other agents for coordination and inference) (Rochat, 2010). Speculatively, this partial translation into a quasi-Cartesian reference frame may provide more effective couplings (or information-sharing) with semi-topographically organized representations in posterior medial cortices. Angular gyrus is depicted as containing a ring-shaped GNN to reflect a further level of abstraction and hierarchical control over action-oriented body schemas—which may potentially mediate coherent functional couplings between the “lived body” and the “mind’s eye”—functionally entailing vectors/tensors over attentional (and potentially intentional) processes (Graziano, 2018). Frontal homologs to posterior GNNs are also depicted, which may provide a variety of higher-order modeling abilities, including epistemic access for extended/distributed self-processes and intentional control mechanisms. These higher-order functionalities may be achieved via frontal cortices being more capable of temporally extended generative modeling (Parr et al., 2019c), and potentially also by virtue of being located further from primary sensory cortices, so affording (“counterfactually rich”) dynamics that are more decoupled from immediate sensorimotor contingencies. Further, these frontal control hierarchies afford multi-scale goal-oriented behavior via bidirectional effective connectivity with the basal ganglia (i.e., winner-take-all dynamics and facilitation of sequential operations) and canalization via diffuse neuro-modulator nuclei of the brainstem (i.e., implicit policies and value signals) (Houk et al., 2007; Humphries and Prescott, 2010; Stephenson-Jones et al., 2011; Dabney et al., 2020; Morrens et al., 2020). Finally, the frontal pole is described as a highly non-linear recurrent system capable of shaping overall activity via bifurcating capacities (Tani, 2016; Wang et al., 2018)—with potentially astronomical combinatorics—providing sources of novelty and rapid adaptation via situation-specific attractor dynamics. While the modal character of prefrontal computation is depicted at the phenomenological level of analysis, IWMT proposes frontal cortices might only indirectly contribute to consciousness via influencing dynamics in posterior cortices. Speculatively, functional analogs for ring-shaped GNN salience/relevance maps may potentially be found in the central complexes of insects and the tectums of all vertebrates (Honkanen et al., 2019), although it is unclear whether those structures would be associated with any kind of subjective experience. Even more speculatively, if these functional mappings were realized in a human-mimetic, neuromorphic AI, then it may have both flexible general intelligence and consciousness. In this way, this figure is a sort of pseudocode for (partially human-interpretable) AGI with “System 2” capacities (Bengio, 2017; Thomas et al., 2018), and possibly also phenomenal consciousness. (Note: The language of predictive processing provides bridges between implementational and computational (and also phenomenological) levels, but descriptions such as vector fields and attracting manifolds could have alternatively been used to remain agnostic as to which implicit algorithms might be entailed by physical dynamics). On the implementational level, biological realizations of algorithmic processes are depicted as corresponding to flows of activity and interactions between neuronal populations, canalized by the formation of metastable synchronous complexes (i.e., “self-organizing harmonic modes”; Safron, 2020a). (Note: The other models discussed in this manuscript do not depend on the accuracy of these putative mappings, nor the hypothesized mechanisms of centralized homunculi and “Cartesian theaters” with semi-topographic correspondences with phenomenology).” [[Images/e6daefd3b6a96fb3b8a0704f8db287a6_MD5.jpeg|Open: Pasted image 20240920043523.png]] ![[Images/e6daefd3b6a96fb3b8a0704f8db287a6_MD5.jpeg]] - An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness Combination of global neuronal workspace theory + integrated information theory + recurrent processing theory + predictive processing theory + neurorepresentationalism + dendritic integration theory [An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness: Neuron](https://www.cell.com/neuron/fulltext/S0896-6273(24)00088-6) ![[Pasted image 20240920043334.png]] - [\[2305.02205\] The inner screen model of consciousness: applying the free energy principle directly to the study of conscious experience](https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.02205) - [Frontiers | Don’t forget the boundary problem! How EM field topology can address the overlooked cousin to the binding problem for consciousness](https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnhum.2023.1233119/full) - [[Philosophy of mind]] - [[Ontology]] - [[Artificial consciousness]] ## Brain storming All the ontologies! All the philosophies of mind! All the models of consciousness! All the interacting scales! As long as it gives some empirical predictions of data! Landscape of possible theories of consciousness has too many degrees of freedom in possible models, that are hard to test empirically, and in possible philosophical assumptions Polyconsciousness: Actual physical implementation of consciousness differs among individuals and philosophers of consciousness reverse engineered their own consciousness implementation (their own Matrix) Under my most used definitions, consciousness (having an experience) is completely unrelated to the ability to reason and intelligence (narrow and general, ability to solve problems in diverse environments, compression, adapt, generalize, agency etc.) "I" "identify" as whatever the neural correlate of consciousness is. What happens to consciousness after death? Why and how did consciousness and experience emerge and how does it work? What are the best definitions of consciousness? What is the solution to the hard problem of consciousness? Does this question even make sense? What even is consciousness in the first place? We need a proper theory of consciousness [[Images/1328316b13fde824bfb8959dcd98d2b6_MD5.jpeg|Open: Pasted image 20240917205839.png]] ![[Images/1328316b13fde824bfb8959dcd98d2b6_MD5.jpeg]] ## Written by AI (may include hallucinated factually incorrect information) Based on the search results, several brain regions and networks have been theorized as potential sources or key components of consciousness: 1. Cerebral cortex The cerebral cortex, particularly certain areas, is widely considered to play a major role in consciousness[2][7]. 2. Thalamus The thalamus, especially its interaction with cortical regions (the thalamocortical loop), is thought to be important for consciousness[3][5]. 3. Brainstem Structures in the brainstem are believed to regulate arousal and wakefulness, which are key aspects of consciousness[1][5]. 4. Default mode network This network of brain regions appears to be involved in consciousness, particularly when combined with thalamic activity[6]. 5. Intralaminar nucleus of the thalamus Damage to this area can produce coma, suggesting its importance for consciousness[7]. 6. Specific brainstem-cortex network A Harvard study identified a network involving the rostral dorsolateral pontine tegmentum in the brainstem, the left ventral anterior insula, and the pregenual anterior cingulate cortex as crucial for consciousness[8]. 7. Frontal lobe Neurons in parts of the frontal lobe have been found to be active during conscious perception[4]. 8. Lateral prefrontal cortex This region has been associated with representing the content of consciousness[4]. 9. Posterior "hot zone" Areas towards the rear of the cortex, including parietal, temporal, and occipital regions, have been implicated in consciousness[2]. It's important to note that consciousness is likely an emergent property arising from the complex interactions of multiple brain regions and networks, rather than being localized to a single area. Research in this field is ongoing, and our understanding continues to evolve. Citations: [1] https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35505255/ [2] https://www.nature.com/articles/s41583-022-00587-4 [3] https://scitechdaily.com/where-does-consciousness-reside-in-the-brain-new-discovery-helps-pinpoint-its-location/ [4] https://www.mpg.de/8425992/seat-of-consciousness [5] https://academic.oup.com/brain/article/124/7/1263/285461?login=false [6] https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/how-does-the-human-brain-create-consciousness-and-why [7] https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1312236/ [8] https://www.sciencealert.com/harvard-scientists-think-they-ve-pinpointed-the-neural-source-of-consciousness ## Written by AI (may include hallucinated factually incorrect information) # The complete map of consciousness definitions Consciousness remains the most contested concept in science and philosophy. No single definition commands consensus. What follows is an exhaustive, hierarchically organized catalog of **157 definitions, theories, and concepts** of consciousness across 10 major fields — each with a one-sentence explanation and a link to a credible source. This map reveals how radically different disciplines carve consciousness at different joints: philosophers ask _what_ it is, neuroscientists ask _where_ and _how_, psychologists ask _when_ and _in what forms_, and contemplative traditions ask _who_ is conscious. --- ## 1. Philosophy of mind Philosophy of mind houses the deepest conceptual disputes about consciousness — what it is, whether it can be explained physically, and what ontological category it belongs to. The entries below span phenomenology, metaphysics, and theories of mental content. ### 1.1 Core distinctions and problems **1. Phenomenal consciousness** — The subjective, experiential quality of mental states — the "what it is like" to undergo an experience such as seeing red or feeling pain. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/) **2. Access consciousness (Ned Block)** — The availability of a mental state's content for use in reasoning, verbal report, and rational control of action, as distinguished from phenomenal consciousness by Ned Block in 1995. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/) **3. Qualia** — The introspectively accessible, subjective, phenomenal properties of mental states — the distinctive "feels" of experiences such as seeing a color, tasting wine, or feeling pain. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/) **4. Intentionality** — The capacity of mental states to be _about_, to represent, or to stand for things, properties, and states of affairs — the "aboutness" or "directedness" of the mind. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/) **5. The hard problem of consciousness (David Chalmers)** — The challenge of explaining _why and how_ physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective phenomenal experience — why there is "something it is like" to be conscious at all. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/) **6. The easy problems of consciousness** — The explanation of cognitive functions and behaviors — such as discriminating stimuli, integrating information, and reporting mental states — which are tractable through standard neuroscientific methods, as distinguished by Chalmers from the hard problem. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/) **7. The explanatory gap (Joseph Levine)** — The conceptual chasm between physical/neural descriptions of brain processes and the subjective character of experience — even a complete physical account seems to leave unexplained _why_ those processes feel a certain way. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/) **8. The knowledge argument / Mary's Room (Frank Jackson)** — The thought experiment of Mary, a scientist who knows all physical facts about color vision from a black-and-white room, used to argue that upon seeing color for the first time she learns something new, suggesting physical facts do not exhaust all facts about experience. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/) **9. Philosophical zombies (p-zombies)** — A hypothetical being physically and functionally identical to a conscious human but entirely lacking phenomenal consciousness, used to argue that consciousness is not entailed by physical facts alone. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/) ### 1.2 Metaphysical positions **10. Substance dualism** — The view, most famously associated with Descartes, that mind and body are fundamentally different kinds of substance — the mental (res cogitans) is non-physical and ontologically distinct from the physical (res extensa). [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/) **11. Property dualism** — The view that while there is only one kind of substance (physical), mental properties — especially phenomenal properties — are ontologically distinct from and not reducible to physical properties. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/) **12. Panpsychism** — The view that mentality or consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the natural world, present in some form in all physical entities, from humans down to fundamental particles. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/) **13. Panprotopsychism** — The view that fundamental physical entities possess not phenomenal properties themselves but "protophenomenal" properties that, when combined in the right way, can collectively constitute full phenomenal consciousness. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/) **14. Idealism** — The metaphysical view that reality is fundamentally mental or mind-dependent — that matter is ultimately grounded in or constituted by mind, consciousness, or ideas. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/) **15. Neutral monism** — The position that the fundamental nature of reality is neither mental nor physical but consists of a more basic, "neutral" substance from which both mental and physical phenomena emerge. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/) **16. Dual-aspect monism** — The thesis that mind and matter are two inseparable aspects or perspectives of a single underlying reality, rather than two distinct substances — often traced to Spinoza. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/) **17. Russellian monism** — Inspired by Bertrand Russell's insight that physics reveals only the structural/relational properties of matter, the view that the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities ground both physical dispositions and phenomenal consciousness. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/russellian-monism/) **18. Epiphenomenalism** — The view that mental events are caused by physical brain processes but have no causal efficacy of their own — consciousness is a causally inert by-product of neural activity. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/) ### 1.3 Reductive and eliminative theories **19. Functionalism** — The theory that what makes something a mental state depends not on its internal physical constitution but on the _functional role_ it plays — its causal relations to sensory inputs, behavioral outputs, and other mental states. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/) **20. Identity theory (mind-brain identity)** — The thesis that mental states are identical to brain states — every type or token of mental state is numerically the same as a particular type or token of neural state. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/) **21. Eliminativism / eliminative materialism** — The radical thesis that our common-sense understanding of the mind ("folk psychology") is deeply mistaken, and that some or all posited mental states do not actually exist and will be eliminated by mature neuroscience. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/) **22. Illusionism (Keith Frankish)** — The view that phenomenal consciousness — understood as involving intrinsic, non-representational qualitative properties (qualia) — is an illusion generated by introspective mechanisms that systematically misrepresent our own experience. [Source](https://keithfrankish.github.io/articles/Frankish_Illusionism%20as%20a%20theory%20of%20consciousness_eprint.pdf) **23. Mysterianism (Colin McGinn)** — The view that the human mind is constitutionally or cognitively closed to understanding how consciousness arises from the brain — the mind-body problem may be a genuine mystery we are inherently incapable of solving. [Source](https://iep.utm.edu/qualia/) **24. Anomalous monism (Donald Davidson)** — The thesis that every individual mental event is identical to some physical event (token identity), but there are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical event types. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/anomalous-monism/) **25. Biological naturalism (John Searle)** — The position that consciousness is a real, irreducible, higher-level biological phenomenon caused by lower-level neurobiological processes, as natural as digestion or photosynthesis. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/) **26. Multiple realizability** — The thesis that the same mental state type (e.g., pain) can be instantiated by many different physical substrates, challenging reductive type-identity theories. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiple-realizability/) ### 1.4 Higher-order and representational theories **27. Higher-order thought theory (HOT)** — David Rosenthal's theory that a mental state becomes conscious when it is the object of a higher-order _thought_ — a meta-representational thought about that very mental state. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-higher/) **28. Higher-order perception theory (HOP)** — The "inner sense" theory, advanced by David Armstrong and William Lycan, that a mental state becomes conscious when monitored by a quasi-perceptual internal scanning mechanism. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-higher/) **29. HOROR (Higher-Order Representation of a Representation)** — Richard Brown's variant holding that consciousness arises from a higher-order representation targeting another representation, combining features of both HOT and HOP. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-higher/) **30. Representationalism** — The thesis that the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is entirely constituted by or supervenes upon the representational/intentional content of that experience. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-representational/) **31. Heterophenomenology (Daniel Dennett)** — Dennett's methodology for studying consciousness by constructing a neutral, third-person catalog of a subject's reported experiences, treating verbal reports as data without granting them incorrigible first-person authority. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/) ### 1.5 Embodied, enacted, and extended approaches **32. Enactivism** — The view that cognition and consciousness arise not through internal computation but through dynamic, embodied interaction between organism and environment — cognition is "enacted" through sensorimotor activity. [Source](https://iep.utm.edu/enactivism/) **33. Embodied cognition** — The thesis that cognitive processes are deeply shaped by, dependent upon, and in some cases constituted by aspects of the agent's body beyond the brain. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/embodied-cognition/) **34. Extended mind thesis** — Andy Clark and David Chalmers's 1998 proposal that cognitive processes can extend beyond brain and body to include external objects (notebooks, computers) that play a functional role equivalent to internal cognition. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-externalism/) **35. 4E cognition (Embodied, Embedded, Enacted, Extended)** — An umbrella framework grouping four anti-Cartesian theses: cognition is Embodied (body-dependent), Embedded (scaffolded by environment), Enacted (constituted through organism–environment interaction), and Extended (spread across brain, body, and world). [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/embodied-cognition/) --- ## 2. Neuroscience of consciousness Neuroscience attacks consciousness empirically, asking which brain structures and processes correlate with, enable, or constitute conscious experience. The field is dominated by several competing theories, each locating consciousness in different neural mechanisms. ### 2.1 Major theories **36. Neural correlates of consciousness (NCC)** — The minimum neuronal mechanisms jointly sufficient for any one specific conscious percept, with recent evidence pointing to a posterior cortical "hot zone." [Source](https://www.nature.com/articles/nrn.2016.22) **37. Global workspace theory (Bernard Baars)** — Consciousness arises when information from specialized, parallel brain processors is selected and broadcast via a central "global workspace" to become widely accessible across the brain, analogous to a theater spotlight. [Source](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16186014/) **38. Neuronal global workspace theory (Stanislas Dehaene)** — Extends Baars's theory by identifying a specific network of pyramidal neurons with long-range axons in prefrontal and parietal cortices that, through a nonlinear "ignition" process, amplifies and globally broadcasts selected sensory information. [Source](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8770991/) **39. Integrated information theory (IIT, Giulio Tononi)** — Consciousness is identical to integrated information (Φ) — a system is conscious to the degree it generates information that is both highly differentiated and highly integrated, irreducible to the sum of its parts. [Source](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/27225071/) **40. Recurrent processing theory (Victor Lamme)** — Conscious visual experience arises from recurrent (feedback) processing within sensory cortical areas, as opposed to the initial feedforward sweep, and such local recurrent processing suffices for phenomenal consciousness. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-neuroscience/) **41. Predictive processing / predictive coding** — The brain constantly generates top-down predictions about incoming sensory input and updates them based on bottom-up prediction errors, with consciousness potentially arising from the hierarchical inference processes that resolve these discrepancies. [Source](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-021-95603-5) **42. Attention schema theory (Michael Graziano)** — The brain constructs a simplified internal model (schema) of its own attention process, and this schematic self-model is what we experience as subjective awareness. [Source](https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116933119) **43. Higher-order theories (neuroscience framing)** — Propose that a mental state becomes conscious when it is the object of a higher-order representation, localized to the prefrontal cortex, such that we become aware of our own perceptual states through meta-cognitive monitoring. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-neuroscience/) ### 2.2 Neural structures and mechanisms **44. Thalamo-cortical loops** — Reciprocal excitatory circuits between the thalamus and neocortex essential for generating and maintaining consciousness; disruption of these loops (e.g., during anesthesia or coma) leads to loss of consciousness. [Source](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9006917/) **45. Default mode network and consciousness** — The DMN — comprising medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate/precuneus, and temporoparietal junctions — is active during self-referential thought and mind-wandering, and its connectivity correlates with level of consciousness. [Source](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2801329/) **46. Claustrum hypothesis (Francis Crick)** — Crick and Koch proposed in 2005 that the claustrum, a thin sheet of gray matter with extensive reciprocal cortical connections, may serve as the "conductor of the orchestra" integrating multi-modal information into unified percepts. [Source](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10493512/) **47. Prefrontal cortex theories of consciousness** — Several theories (including Global Neuronal Workspace and higher-order theories) assign the prefrontal cortex a central role in consciousness, though debate continues about whether prefrontal activity reflects consciousness itself or post-perceptual cognitive operations. [Source](https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.749868/full) **48. Posterior cortical hot zone** — A region encompassing parietal, temporal, and occipital cortices identified by Koch et al. as the most likely substrate for content-specific neural correlates of consciousness. [Source](https://www.nature.com/articles/nrn.2016.22) **49. Reticular activating system** — A brainstem network regulating arousal, sleep-wake transitions, and overall level of consciousness via ascending projections to thalamus and cortex; damage causes coma. [Source](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/neuroscience/reticular-activating-system) **50. Gamma oscillations and consciousness** — Neural oscillations at **30–100 Hz** are implicated in temporal binding of distributed sensory features into unified conscious percepts, with synchronous gamma activity across thalamocortical networks thought to contribute to information integration. [Source](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3269033/) **51. Re-entrant processing** — Top-down feedback signaling from higher cortical areas back to lower sensory areas, considered essential by multiple theories for transforming unconscious feedforward representations into conscious perceptual experiences. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-neuroscience/) **52. Temporo-parietal junction and consciousness** — The TPJ is implicated in conscious awareness through its roles in attentional reorienting, self-other distinction, and bodily self-consciousness; right TPJ damage classically causes hemispatial neglect. [Source](https://academic.oup.com/nc/article/2018/1/niy005/4955859) ### 2.3 Measures and paradigms **53. Phi (Φ) — integrated information measure** — The central mathematical quantity in IIT, defined as the amount of integrated information a system generates above and beyond its parts; higher Φ corresponds to greater consciousness. [Source](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/15522121/) **54. Perturbational complexity index (PCI)** — Measures algorithmic complexity of the brain's EEG response to TMS, capturing how well the thalamocortical system generates activity that is simultaneously integrated and differentiated, reliably discriminating conscious from unconscious states. [Source](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/23946194/) **55. Neural ignition** — The sudden, nonlinear, all-or-nothing activation of a widespread fronto-parietal network that transforms local unconscious processing into a globally broadcast conscious representation. [Source](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8770991/) **56. No-report paradigms** — Experimental designs that identify "true" neural correlates of consciousness by eliminating the confound of motor reports, using indirect physiological measures to infer conscious perception without requiring subjects to report. [Source](https://www.nature.com/articles/nrn.2016.22) **57. Dendritic integration theory** — Consciousness depends on the flexible integration of bottom-up sensory and top-down contextual information at the level of **layer 5 pyramidal neurons**, where coupling of dendritic compartments gates the complex dynamics underlying conscious states. [Source](https://www.cell.com/trends/cognitive-sciences/fulltext/S1364-6613\(20\)30175-3) **58. Orchestrated objective reduction (Penrose-Hameroff Orch-OR)** — Consciousness arises from quantum computations in microtubules within neurons, where biologically "orchestrated" quantum coherence undergoes objective reduction (wave function collapse) related to spacetime geometry. [Source](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/24070914/) --- ## 3. Psychology Psychology examines consciousness through the lens of subjective experience, attention, self-awareness, and altered states, contributing both introspective methods and rigorous experimental paradigms. ### 3.1 Foundational concepts **59. Stream of consciousness (William James)** — James's 1890 description of consciousness as a continuous, unbroken flow of thoughts, feelings, and sensations — "a river or a stream" — rather than a chain of discrete mental states. [Source](https://psychclassics.yorku.ca/James/jimmy11.htm) **60. Unconscious mind** — In psychoanalytic theory, a repository of repressed desires, memories, and impulses inaccessible to conscious awareness yet powerfully influencing behavior through dreams, slips, and symptoms. [Source](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2440575/) **61. Subconscious** — Mental processes operating just below conscious awareness — including automatic functions, stored memories, and learned behaviors — that can influence thoughts and actions but can often be brought into awareness with focused attention. [Source](https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/subconscious) **62. Preconscious (Freud)** — In Freud's topographical model, thoughts, memories, and knowledge not currently conscious but readily retrievable — a "waiting room" between the conscious and deeply repressed unconscious. [Source](https://www.simplypsychology.org/unconscious-mind.html) **63. Self-awareness** — The capacity to direct attention inward and recognize oneself as a distinct individual, encompassing both reflective self-awareness (awareness of one's own mental states) and social self-awareness (understanding how one is perceived by others). [Source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-awareness) **64. Introspection** — The systematic examination of one's own mental processes, thoughts, and emotions — historically championed by Wilhelm Wundt as the primary tool of psychological research. [Source](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3318768/) **65. Metacognition** — "Thinking about thinking" — the awareness, monitoring, and regulation of one's own cognitive processes, including knowledge of one's learning strategies, strengths, and weaknesses, coined by John Flavell. [Source](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3719211/) ### 3.2 States and alterations **66. Altered states of consciousness** — Significant deviations from ordinary waking consciousness — induced by meditation, hypnosis, psychoactive substances, sensory deprivation, or pathological conditions — involving changes in perception, cognition, time sense, and self-awareness. [Source](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/altered-states-of-consciousness) **67. Flow states (Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi)** — An optimal state of consciousness characterized by complete absorption in a challenging activity matched to one's skills, producing merged action and awareness, loss of self-consciousness, and distorted time perception. [Source](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7551835/) **68. Dissociation** — A psychological process involving disconnection between thoughts, identity, consciousness, and memory — ranging from normal daydreaming to pathological conditions like dissociative identity disorder — often an adaptive response to trauma. [Source](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/altered-states-of-consciousness) **69. Levels of consciousness** — A clinical and psychological spectrum from full alert wakefulness through drowsiness, lethargy, obtundation, stupor, and coma, reflecting degree of arousal mediated by the ascending reticular activating system. [Source](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK380/) **70. Wakefulness vs. awareness distinction** — Consciousness comprises two dissociable components: **wakefulness** (arousal, mediated by the brainstem) and **awareness** (content of consciousness, mediated by the cortex) — critical for understanding the vegetative state. [Source](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3222861/) **71. Minimal consciousness** — A clinical condition after brain injury where patients show inconsistent but discernible evidence of self- or environmental awareness, distinguishing it from the vegetative state. [Source](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK513298/) **72. Threshold / liminal consciousness** — The transitional boundary between waking and sleep (hypnagogic state), where brain activity shifts from alpha to theta waves and spontaneous imagery, hallucinations, and loosened associative thinking emerge. [Source](https://dictionary.apa.org/threshold-of-consciousness) **73. Hypnosis and consciousness** — A waking state involving focused attention, heightened suggestibility, reduced peripheral awareness, and enhanced capacity to respond to suggestion, with altered default mode network and frontal attentional activity. [Source](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/36566091/) **74. Lucid dreaming** — A hybrid state during REM sleep in which the dreamer becomes aware they are dreaming and may gain volitional control over dream content, with neural correlates including increased frontal cortex activation. [Source](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5652011/) **75. Psychedelic states and consciousness** — Profoundly altered consciousness induced by psilocybin, LSD, and DMT, characterized by ego dissolution, enhanced imagery, and mystical experiences, neurobiologically associated with disruption of the default mode network and increased neural entropy. [Source](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5652011/) ### 3.3 Perceptual phenomena **76. Blindsight** — The demonstrated ability of individuals with primary visual cortex damage to respond to visual stimuli in their blind field above chance, despite reporting no conscious visual experience — dissociating visual processing from conscious perception. [Source](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8884361/) **77. Change blindness** — The failure to detect large, clearly visible changes in a visual scene when the change coincides with a brief disruption (blink, saccade, or flicker), revealing limits in how the brain encodes visual information across moments. [Source](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26302304/) **78. Inattentional blindness** — The failure to perceive a fully visible but unexpected stimulus when attention is engaged elsewhere, as in Simons and Chabris's "invisible gorilla" experiment, revealing that **focused attention is a prerequisite for conscious awareness**. [Source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inattentional_blindness) --- ## 4. Medical and clinical perspectives Clinical medicine operationalizes consciousness through standardized scales, diagnostic criteria, and interventions, transforming philosophical abstractions into life-or-death assessments. **79. Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS)** — Introduced in 1974 by Teasdale and Jennett, a standardized tool scoring eye opening (1–4), verbal response (1–5), and motor response (1–6) for a total of **3 (deep coma) to 15 (fully alert)**. [Source](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK513298/) **80. Disorders of consciousness spectrum** — A clinical continuum following severe brain injury — from coma through vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome to minimally conscious state — reflecting varying impairment in arousal and awareness. [Source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disorders_of_consciousness) **81. Coma** — A state of eyes-closed, unarousable unresponsiveness with no purposeful response, no sleep-wake cycles, and no awareness, resulting from bilateral hemispheric or brainstem damage. [Source](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK380/) **82. Vegetative state / unresponsive wakefulness syndrome** — A condition with preserved sleep-wake cycles and spontaneous eye opening (wakefulness) but no reproducible evidence of awareness, voluntary behavior, or meaningful communication. [Source](https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laneur/article/PIIS1474-4422\(14\)70152-8/fulltext) **83. Minimally conscious state (MCS)** — Formally defined by Giacino et al. (2002), a condition of severely altered consciousness with inconsistent but clearly discernible behavioral signs of awareness — following commands, visual pursuit, or intelligible speech. [Source](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8917895/) **84. Locked-in syndrome** — A condition (typically from bilateral ventral pontine lesions) where the patient retains **full consciousness and cognition** but is completely paralyzed except for vertical eye movements and blinking. [Source](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10064471/) **85. Anesthesia and consciousness** — General anesthesia pharmacologically induces reversible unconsciousness by disrupting thalamocortical integration and fronto-parietal connectivity, with agents like propofol and sevoflurane acting through distinct mechanisms that convergently impair integrated information processing. [Source](https://www.bjaopen.org/article/S2772-6096\(23\)00103-X/fulltext) **86. Brain death criteria** — The irreversible cessation of all brain functions including the brainstem, diagnosed by absence of consciousness, cranial nerve reflexes, and spontaneous respiration — the legal standard for death in most jurisdictions. [Source](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/neuroscience/brain-death) **87. Akinetic mutism** — A neurological syndrome of absent speech and voluntary movement despite preserved wakefulness and sensorimotor capacity, caused by bilateral frontal or anterior cingulate damage disrupting motivational pathways. [Source](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32044373/) **88. Delirium and consciousness** — An acute, transient disturbance of consciousness with fluctuating attention, awareness, orientation, and perception, caused by medical conditions or drugs that globally impair arousal mechanisms. [Source](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2117593/) **89. Epilepsy and consciousness** — Seizures produce multiple consciousness alterations — auras, impaired awareness, unresponsiveness, and post-ictal delirium — from excessive electrical discharges disrupting normal cortical networks. [Source](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/24981417/) **90. Neurophenomenology** — Francisco Varela's 1996 research program integrating rigorous first-person phenomenological investigation of experience with third-person neuroscientific data, offering a methodological approach to the explanatory gap. [Source](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/10597123221080193) **91. Perturbational complexity index (PCI) — clinical use** — A behavior-independent brain measure that reliably discriminates conscious from unconscious states across sleep, anesthesia, and disorders of consciousness by quantifying EEG response complexity after TMS perturbation. [Source](https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/scitranslmed.3006294) --- ## 5. Artificial intelligence and machine consciousness The question of whether machines can be conscious has moved from philosophical thought experiment to urgent practical concern as AI systems grow more sophisticated. ### 5.1 Core concepts **92. Artificial consciousness** — The interdisciplinary endeavor to understand, model, and potentially create consciousness in artificial systems, addressing whether machines can be genuinely conscious. [Source](https://iep.utm.edu/ethics-of-artificial-intelligence/) **93. Machine consciousness** — Largely synonymous with artificial consciousness, referring to the challenge of endowing machines with phenomenal experience beyond mere simulation of intelligent behavior. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/artificial-intelligence/) **94. Synthetic consciousness** — Consciousness that is synthetically engineered rather than biologically evolved, encompassing proposals for creating experience in non-biological substrates. [Source](https://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~koehl/Teaching/ECS188_F20/PDF_files/AI_conscious.pdf) **95. AGI and consciousness** — AGI refers to AI capable of any human intellectual task, raising the open question of whether achieving human-level general intelligence necessarily entails conscious experience or whether intelligence and consciousness are dissociable. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/artificial-intelligence/) **96. Digital sentience** — The hypothetical capacity of digital systems to have subjective experiences — particularly the ability to feel pleasure and suffering — a major topic of concern as AI grows more sophisticated. [Source](https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.08867) **97. Artificial sentience** — The prospect that engineered systems could possess genuine sentience, raising profound ethical questions about moral consideration and rights. [Source](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10436038/) **98. AI moral status and consciousness** — The philosophical question of whether AI systems possessing (or possibly possessing) consciousness deserve moral consideration, protection, and rights. [Source](https://iep.utm.edu/ethics-of-artificial-intelligence/) ### 5.2 Arguments and frameworks **99. Chinese Room argument (John Searle)** — Searle's 1980 thought experiment arguing that a computer executing symbol manipulation rules cannot possess genuine understanding or consciousness, because **syntax is insufficient for semantics**. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/) **100. Turing test and consciousness** — Turing's 1950 proposal that a machine should be considered intelligent if linguistically indistinguishable from a human, though critics note the test evaluates behavioral imitation rather than genuine consciousness. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/turing-test/) **101. Computational theory of mind** — The thesis that the mind is literally a computing system — that mental processes are computations operating over internal symbolic representations, similar to those executed by a Turing machine. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/) **102. Substrate independence** — The hypothesis that mental states are defined by functional organization rather than physical composition, implying consciousness could in principle be realized in biological neurons, silicon, or other substrates. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiple-realizability/) **103. Strong AI vs. weak AI** — Searle's distinction: Strong AI holds that suitably programmed computers literally understand and think, while Weak AI holds that computers merely simulate mental abilities without genuine consciousness. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/) **104. Symbol grounding problem** — Harnad's (1990) problem of how meaningless symbols in a computational system can acquire intrinsic meaning — how they can be connected to real-world objects rather than defined only in terms of other symbols. [Source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbol_grounding_problem) **105. Computational functionalism** — The specific form of functionalism identifying mental states with computational states, making it the primary philosophical target of the Chinese Room argument. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/) **106. Functional consciousness in AI** — The functionalist view that any system instantiating the right pattern of causal/functional relationships would be conscious, regardless of physical makeup — including an AI. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/) **107. Embodied AI and consciousness** — The perspective, rooted in embodied cognition, that consciousness is deeply dependent on physical embodiment and sensorimotor interaction, suggesting disembodied AI may be fundamentally limited. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/embodied-cognition/) **108. Whole brain emulation and consciousness** — The hypothetical scanning and computational simulation of a biological brain, raising whether a digital replica would be conscious and whether identity would transfer. [Source](https://consc.net/papers/uploading.pdf) **109. IIT applied to AI** — When IIT's framework is applied to AI, it controversially predicts that standard digital computers may lack the intrinsic causal structure required for genuine consciousness despite computational power. [Source](https://iep.utm.edu/integrated-information-theory-of-consciousness/) --- ## 6. Quantum consciousness Quantum approaches to consciousness propose that quantum mechanics plays a non-trivial role in generating subjective experience, ranging from specific neural mechanisms to fundamental interpretive frameworks. **110. Quantum mind hypothesis** — The broad family of proposals asserting that quantum phenomena — superposition, entanglement, coherence — play a functional role in cognitive processes and/or consciousness, beyond classical neural computation. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-consciousness/) **111. Quantum coherence in the brain** — The hypothesis that quantum coherence could persist in warm, wet neural systems long enough to play a functional role in consciousness, despite the challenges of environmental decoherence. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-consciousness/) **112. Orchestrated objective reduction (Orch-OR)** — Penrose and Hameroff's theory that consciousness arises from quantum computations in microtubules undergoing self-collapse (objective reduction) at a threshold determined by quantum gravity. [Source](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1571064513001188) **113. Quantum consciousness — Henry Stapp** — Stapp's approach, building on von Neumann, proposes that conscious intentions influence brain activity through quantum state reductions, with the **Quantum Zeno Effect** allowing attention to prolong and select brain states. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-consciousness/) **114. Quantum Bayesianism (QBism) and consciousness** — QBism interprets quantum states not as objective reality but as subjective degrees of belief about future experiences, placing the conscious agent at the center of quantum theory. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/quantum-bayesian/) **115. Microtubule quantum processing** — The hypothesis that microtubules within neurons serve as biological quantum computers, with tubulin dimers acting as qubits in superposition states performing computations relevant to consciousness. [Source](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsta.1998.0254) **116. Quantum entanglement and consciousness** — The speculative proposal that quantum entanglement might bind disparate neural processes into unified experience or underlie the holistic character of subjective awareness. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-consciousness/) **117. Von Neumann–Wigner interpretation** — The interpretation that wave function collapse requires the intervention of a conscious observer, assigning consciousness a fundamental causal role in physics. [Source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness_causes_collapse) --- ## 7. Complex systems and emergence Complexity science offers frameworks for understanding how consciousness might arise from interactions among simpler components, emphasizing self-organization, feedback, and emergent properties. **118. Emergence and consciousness** — The position that conscious experience arises as a novel, higher-level property from the complex organization of non-conscious components in ways not straightforwardly predictable from those components alone. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/) **119. Strong emergence vs. weak emergence** — Weak emergence holds that higher-level properties are in principle deducible from lower-level facts; strong emergence holds that some properties (consciousness being the primary candidate) are **fundamentally irreducible**, possessing novel causal powers. [Source](https://iep.utm.edu/emergence/) **120. Autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela)** — Defines living systems as self-producing, operationally closed networks that continuously regenerate the components constituting them, providing a framework for cognition as coextensive with life. [Source](https://iep.utm.edu/enactivism/) **121. Self-organization and consciousness** — The spontaneous emergence of ordered, coherent patterns of neural activity from local interactions without centralized control, suggesting conscious states arise at critical points far from equilibrium. [Source](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7597170/) **122. Dynamical systems approach** — Models consciousness as a trajectory through a high-dimensional state space, emphasizing that experience may correspond to specific types of complex, metastable dynamic patterns rather than static representations. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/) **123. Strange loops (Douglas Hofstadter)** — A self-referential hierarchical structure in which moving through levels eventually leads back to the starting point, proposed as the essential mechanism by which self-awareness and the "I" emerge from tangled brain processes. [Source](https://iep.utm.edu/self-con/) **124. Complexity and consciousness** — The proposal that conscious experience is associated with an optimal balance between integration and differentiation — a "sweet spot" between order and disorder — as formalized in measures like Φ and PCI. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/) **125. Free energy principle and consciousness (Karl Friston)** — All self-organizing biological systems minimize variational free energy; applied to consciousness, this suggests experience emerges from hierarchical generative models that continuously predict and minimize prediction errors. [Source](https://www.nature.com/articles/nrn2787) **126. Cybernetics and consciousness** — Founded by Wiener and Ashby, cybernetics approaches consciousness through feedback loops, information processing, and self-regulation, providing early frameworks for understanding how self-referential systems produce adaptive behavior. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cybernetics/) --- ## 8. Evolutionary biology Evolutionary perspectives ask when, why, and in what organisms consciousness emerged, connecting subjective experience to adaptive function and phylogenetic history. **127. Evolution of consciousness** — Concerns how and why subjective experience emerged, with proposals ranging from consciousness as a late-evolving capacity linked to complex neural architectures to gradualist views tracing proto-conscious states to the earliest nervous systems. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-animal/) **128. Animal consciousness** — The investigation of whether and to what extent nonhuman animals possess subjective experience, with growing evidence supporting rich conscious experiences in mammals, birds, and possibly many other taxa. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-animal/) **129. Sentience vs. sapience** — **Sentience** is the capacity to feel sensations (pleasure, pain); **sapience** denotes higher-order capacities like wisdom, judgment, and self-reflection — a distinction crucial for determining which beings warrant moral consideration. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-animal/) **130. Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (2012)** — A formal proclamation by prominent neuroscientists that "the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness," asserting consciousness in mammals, birds, and other organisms. [Source](https://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf) **131. Mirror test / mirror self-recognition** — Developed by Gordon Gallup Jr. in 1970, the test assesses self-awareness by determining whether an animal recognizes its own reflection — confirmed in great apes, elephants, dolphins, magpies, and possibly cleaner wrasse. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-animal/) **132. Theory of mind in animals** — The capacity to attribute mental states — beliefs, desires, intentions — to others, with evidence from primates and corvids suggesting some nonhuman animals can predict behavior based on inferred psychological states. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cognition-animal/) **133. Insect consciousness** — Whether organisms with ~1 million neurons can have subjective experience, with Barron and Klein's (2016) argument based on functional analogies between insect central complex and vertebrate midbrain suggesting basic conscious states are possible. [Source](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8175961/) **134. Cephalopod consciousness** — Whether octopuses, cuttlefish, and squid — invertebrates with up to **500 million neurons**, exhibiting tool use, play, and individual recognition — have subjective experiences, with growing evidence supporting this possibility. [Source](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9039538/) **135. Plant consciousness debate** — The controversial question of whether plants, which lack nervous systems but exhibit sophisticated adaptive behaviors and signaling, possess any form of experience — rejected by most neuroscientists but explored in "plant neurobiology." [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-animal/) **136. Gradualism in consciousness evolution** — The Darwinian view that consciousness evolved incrementally across species, with increasingly complex forms of subjective experience emerging gradually alongside neural complexity. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-animal/) --- ## 9. Eastern philosophy and contemplative traditions Eastern traditions offer some of the oldest and most sophisticated analyses of consciousness, often treating it not as a puzzle to be solved but as a reality to be directly investigated through contemplative practice. ### 9.1 Buddhist approaches **137. Buddhist consciousness (vijñāna)** — One of the five aggregates (skandhas), vijñāna is the discerning faculty of experience that arises dependently through contact between sense organs and objects, with no enduring self behind it. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-indian-buddhism/) **138. Abhidharma (Buddhist psychology)** — The systematic Buddhist tradition classifying all elements of experience (dharmas) into detailed taxonomies of mental factors and consciousness types, amounting to a comprehensive phenomenology of mind. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abhidharma/) **139. Mindfulness (sati)** — The Buddhist faculty of present-moment, non-judgmental awareness — the seventh element of the Noble Eightfold Path — involving sustained attention to bodily sensations, feelings, and mental states. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-indian-buddhism/) **140. Śūnyatā (emptiness) and consciousness** — The Mahāyāna doctrine that all phenomena, including consciousness itself, are empty of inherent existence, arising only through dependent origination — central to Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka philosophy. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nagarjuna/) **141. Rigpa (Dzogchen awareness)** — The innate, primordial, non-dual awareness that is the true nature of mind in the Dzogchen tradition — knowing, clear, and unchanging — recognition of which constitutes enlightenment. [Source](https://encyclopediaofbuddhism.org/wiki/Dzogchen) ### 9.2 Hindu and yogic approaches **142. Ātman (Hindu consciousness)** — The eternal, unchanging essence of the individual, identical with pure consciousness and ultimately non-different from universal reality (Brahman) in Vedantic thought. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/personhood-india/) **143. Brahman (universal consciousness)** — The ultimate, infinite reality in Hindu philosophy — **sat-chit-ānanda** (existence-consciousness-bliss) — the metaphysical foundation of the universe and identical with Ātman in Advaita Vedanta. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/shankara/) **144. Chit (pure consciousness)** — One of the three defining attributes of Brahman in the Vedantic formula sat-chit-ānanda, denoting consciousness not as a property of Brahman but as its very intrinsic nature. [Source](https://iep.utm.edu/advaita-vedanta/) **145. Advaita Vedanta (non-dual consciousness)** — Śaṅkara's teaching that ultimate reality is non-dual pure consciousness (Brahman) and that the apparent multiplicity of the world and the distinction between self and Brahman are products of ignorance (avidyā). [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/shankara/) **146. Puruṣa (consciousness in Sāṃkhya)** — The eternal, inactive principle of pure witness-consciousness in Sāṃkhya philosophy, distinct from Prakṛti (material nature), whose discriminative separation constitutes liberation. [Source](https://iep.utm.edu/sankhya/) **147. Yoga and consciousness (Patañjali)** — In Patañjali's Yoga Sūtras, yoga is "citta vṛtti nirodha" — cessation of all mental fluctuations — aiming for a state where pure consciousness (puruṣa) recognizes itself as distinct from material nature. [Source](https://iep.utm.edu/yoga/) **148. Turīya (fourth state)** — The transcendent state of pure, non-dual consciousness described in the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad that underlies waking, dreaming, and deep sleep, representing the true self identical with Brahman. [Source](https://iep.utm.edu/upanisad/) **149. Samādhi (absorption)** — The culminating state of yogic meditation where the distinction between meditator, meditation, and object dissolves, yielding direct experience of pure consciousness uncontaminated by mental modifications. [Source](https://iep.utm.edu/yoga/) ### 9.3 Other traditions **150. Meditation and consciousness** — A diverse set of contemplative practices that systematically train attention and awareness, producing measurable alterations in states of consciousness including enhanced present-moment awareness and access to non-ordinary states. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/) **151. Taoism and consciousness** — Consciousness understood through the Tao — the ineffable source of all things — where the ideal awareness involves wu wei (non-forced action), emptying the mind of distinctions, and harmonizing with the spontaneous flow of nature. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/taoism/) --- ## 10. Social and cultural dimensions Consciousness is not only an individual phenomenon but is shaped, constructed, and expressed through social structures, language, and cultural frameworks. **152. Collective consciousness (Émile Durkheim)** — The shared beliefs, ideas, moral attitudes, and knowledge operating as a unifying social force that transcends individual minds and exerts normative power over behavior. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/collective-intentionality/) **153. Social construction of consciousness** — The view that higher-order self-reflective awareness and narrative identity are significantly shaped by social interactions, language, cultural practices, and internalized norms. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-ontology/) **154. Cultural variations in consciousness concepts** — Different cultures conceptualize consciousness in fundamentally different ways — from Western emphasis on individual subjectivity, to Buddhist impermanent aggregates, to Indigenous relational and ecological awareness. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/) **155. Intersubjectivity** — The shared understanding arising between conscious subjects through empathy, perception, and communication — developed by Husserl and elaborated by Stein and Merleau-Ponty — addressing how consciousness is inherently oriented toward other minds. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/husserl/) **156. Shared intentionality** — Michael Tomasello's concept of the uniquely human capacity for collaborative activities with shared goals and mutual psychological awareness — "we-intentions" enabling joint attention and cultural institutions. [Source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/collective-intentionality/) **157. Bicameral mind theory (Julian Jaynes)** — Jaynes's 1976 hypothesis that introspective consciousness emerged only ~3,000 years ago, and that earlier humans operated under a "bicameral" mentality where auditory hallucinations from one hemisphere were experienced as divine commands. [Source](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8720781/) --- ## Conclusion This catalog reveals that consciousness is not one concept but a **cluster of deeply interrelated problems** approached through incommensurable frameworks. Three patterns stand out. First, the field is converging on a small set of empirically testable neuroscientific theories — Global Neuronal Workspace, IIT, Recurrent Processing, and Attention Schema Theory — that will likely be adjudicated by adversarial collaboration experiments already underway. Second, the hardest questions remain philosophical: no amount of neural data alone resolves the explanatory gap between third-person brain activity and first-person experience. Third, the boundaries of consciousness are expanding — from humans to animals to insects to AI to quantum systems — making the question of _what counts_ as conscious increasingly urgent for ethics, law, and technology policy. Eastern contemplative traditions, which have investigated consciousness phenomenologically for millennia, are now informing neuroscience through neurophenomenology and meditation research, suggesting the most productive future path integrates first-person and third-person methods. The 157 entries above are not a closed set — they are a living map of humanity's most ambitious scientific and philosophical project. More: [[AI-written Consciousness]]